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The Harlem Community Justice Center (Justice Center) officially
opened in July 2000 with all the fanfare of a major civic event. The
Chief Judge of the State of New York, Judith Kaye, and the Mayor of
the City of New York, Rudolph Guiliani, were keynote speakers,
lauding the combined efforts of private administrators and public
officials in reopening a deteriorating but magnificent 1892 court building
in the center of Harlem. The ceremony began and ended with gospel
sung by the Addicts Rehabilitation Center Choir, a musical reflection of
one component of the Justice Center's jurisdiction. The new Juvenile
Intervention Court will focus on young people arrested for non-violent
drug-related offenses or who are at risk of substance abuse. The Justice
Center also contains a fledgling Youth Court, where teenagers trained as
"judge, jury, and attorneys" judge their peers who have been charged
with low-level offenses.' Before joining the Chief Judge and the Mayor
in a ribbon-cutting ceremony, a Youth Court member addressed the
assembled notables and community members, remarking on the positive
impact the Youth Court had already had on her life. While the Justice
Center will handle a significant proportion of local landlord-tenant court
matters, its role as a component of the New York City Family Court
raises some of the most confounding judicial reform issues.
The Justice Center describes its "Youth Justice" role as addressing
"youth crime in East and Central Harlem. "2 To achieve this:
the Justice Center works intensively with young people who
have engaged in delinquent behavior, providing them with the
tools they need to get on the right track and avoid further
offending. The Justice Center also engages in comprehensive
* Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I
would like to thank Christolette Hoey for research assistance, Michele Cortese and Jane
Waldfogel for comments on earlier drafts, and Warren Scharf for his peerless editorial
pen. This Article is dedicated to the memory of the two inspiring JRD Kays: Kathryn
A. McDonald and Kay McNally. Jane Spinak can be reached at spinak@law.
columbia.edu.
1. Youth Justice Fact Sheet, Harlem Community Justice Center (May 17, 2001)
(on file with author).
2. Id.
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prevention activities, reaching out to at-risk-youths before they
get into trouble with the law and providing them with the skills
to make better life choices.3
The Justice Center thus incorporates assessment services and the partial
provision of treatment and preventive services as part of the court's
responsibilities. The presiding judge assumes an active monitoring
function, closely watching the youth's progress and relying on graduated
sanctions to promote individual accountability.4
Watching the Justice Center's opening ceremony in the brightly
painted, light-filled, and airy central courtroom reminded me of another
ceremony I witnessed two years earlier-the first "graduation" of
mothers who had completed their participation in New York City's first
Family Court Treatment Part (FCTP). The FCTP was the first "model
part" introduced into Family Court in New York City.' As with the
Justice Center, the FCTP shares some common features with other
model Family Court parts being developed nationwide: an activist judge
who helps to fashion, and then closely monitor, dispositions; a "team"
of lawyers, social workers, and court personnel who try to identify and
then work toward common goals with the family; and frequent and
meaningful court appearances by relevant parties.6  In the FCTP,
parents accused of neglecting their children because of their substance
abuse participate in an extensive court conferencing and monitoring
system. 7 Parents eligible for the FCTP are assessed by the FCTP
clinical staff, are required to waive their right to a litigated hearing, and
must admit that the neglect was caused by their addiction.8 The parent
then enters into a negotiated treatment plan that has been created by the
FCTP clinical staff, the parent and her counsel, the lawyer for the
children, and the child protective agency's attorney and caseworker; the
plan has also been approved by the presiding judge.9 The parent is then
referred immediately to treatment providers who have contracted with
the court to have available treatment spaces.'0  What ensues is an
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Robert Victor Wolf, Fixing Families: The Story of the Manhattan Family
Treatment Court, J. CENTER FOR FAMS., CHILD. & CTS., 2000, at 5.
6. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
7. Wolf, supra note 5, at 13-14.
8. Id. at 11-12.
9. Id.
10. Hon. Gloria Sosa-Lintner, Child Abuse, Neglect and the Foster Care System:
Effective Social Work and the Legal System; The Attorney's Role and Responsibilities
2000: Family Treatment Court, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS 609, 616 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Order No, 00-000W, 2000).
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intensive period of court supervision, with frequent in-court drug testing
and appearances by the parent and other FCTP "team" members,
including the lawyers and agency caseworkers."1 Sanctions for positive
drug tests or other lapses in compliance with the treatment plan can
range from more frequent drug testing and court attendance to ultimate
dismissal from the FCTP, which returns the case to the general pool.12
Rewards can include longer periods of visitation and less supervision of
the parent with her children.' 3
During the first two years of the FCTP, thirty parents and
guardians were reunited with seventy-two children whose average length
of stay in foster care was eleven months.14 Approximately sixty-eight
percent of the parent participants were in compliance with court
mandates at the start of the FCTP's third year.' 5 In New York City,
where children spend an average of four years in foster care,' 6 these
numbers are stunning. For the 243 families (including 453 children)
referred to the FCTP during the first two years of its existence, 7 the
results are life-changing. Not only are large numbers of families
reunited at a record pace, but parents complete treatment and are
provided with individualized services that are likely to help them remain
sober and stable.' 8  For everyone-from the judge who has closely
monitored the parent's progress, to the child protective agency attorney
who no longer has to consider terminating parental rights, to the
children's attorney who is happy to see her clients return home-there is
a palpable sense of accomplishment.' 9 At the "graduation," ceremonies
that occur with increasing regularity, there are cheers, applause, flowers
and exhilaration rarely experienced by the parents, the children, or the
Family Court professionals.
The Justice Center's opening produced that same headiness: a sense
of possibility-of young lives saved, of older ones being given new
11. Id.
12. Id. at 628-29.
13. Wolf, supra note 5, at 15-16.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id.
16. Unfinished Business: Analyzing NYC's Foster Care Reforms, CHILD
WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2000, at 10.
17. Wolf, supra note 5, at 19.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 19-20. As with many other experiments, the choice of participants
affects success. The selection process for the initial participants in the FCTP screened
out many of the most serious allegations, such as abuse, and many of the more
complicating factors, such as domestic violence and mental illness. Id. at 10-11. The
planners hoped to gain experience with "easier" cases before expanding the participation
criteria. Id. While this decision is understandable, it also ensures a greater likelihood of
success and affects the validity of the results and the capacity to generalize about them.
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opportunities, and a sense of community endeavor (as opposed to solely
individual triumph, though there is plenty of that). However, my own
delight at both ceremonies was tempered by a darker vision of day-to-
day reality in most Family Courts and by a substantial concern about
whether "reform" or "model" courts created to address child welfare
issues can produce systemic, lasting reform. This Article will explore
that concern by reviewing current Family Court model court reform
efforts in New York and nation-wide through a number of lenses.
Part I begins with a short description of Family Court, identifying
some of the unique features of the court and considering some of the
past and current efforts to reform the court by taking those features into
account. This is followed by a proposal to analyze Family Court reform
through a substantive rather than procedural lens, focusing on the value
that families may derive from coming under the court's jurisdiction. Part
II contains a description of current New York Family Court reform
efforts in the context of the present conditions existing in these courts.
Part III considers some preliminary information about the progress of
model courts in New York and around the country. Finally, Part IV
draws on the earlier discussion to recommend aspects of the model court
reform movement that may have lasting, transformative potential for
Family Court.
I. THE VALUE OF FAMILY COURT
Throughout its one hundred-year national history, the court
variously called Juvenile Court, Domestic Court, Children's Court, or
Family Court has struggled with defining its role and responsibilities.'2
This struggle is reflected in an assortment of overlapping ways.
Although most states have created some type of Family Court as either a
separate court or a division of a trial court,2' the jurisdictional authority
granted to these courts over family law issues varies considerably. New
York's Family Court, for example, has original jurisdiction over some
20. Juvenile Court began as an alternative to adult criminal court for children
in trouble with the law. Courts variously called Family or Children's Courts expanded
their purview to other types of family problems. For a full discussion of the
definitional difference, see Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary
Framework for Court Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family
Court, 71 S. CAL. L. Rv. 469 (1998). For purposes of this Article, I am using the
broadest description of Family Court to include multiple areas of jurisdiction, such as
that of New York, which includes delinquency, child welfare, child support, status
offenses, family offenses, custody and visitation, guardianship, and adoption within its
purview. My focus, however, is on child welfare proceedings.
21. Id. at 505-06. Barbara Babb has completed the most comprehensive review
of the current state of Family Courts throughout the country.
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family issues, such as child protective and delinquency proceedings, 22
concurrent jurisdiction over others, such as custody and family
offenses, 23 and no jurisdiction over divorce.24  Such variations in
jurisdictional authority continue to fuel the most persistent calls for
Family Court reform, particularly the need for a unified Family Court
system to integrate the court's response to all aspects of a family's needs
when its members appear in court.25 The arguments in support of this
integration are fairly straightforward and reasonable: diminished
jurisdictional and decisional conflicts, greater time and resource
efficiencies for courts and litigants, and dedicated court personnel and
judicial officers.' A unified Family Court system would expand the
jurisdictional structure of the court that has existed, with only some
variation, since its creation. Family Court in New York, for example,
traditionally has had tripartite roles: the court dispenses "individualized"
justice for the parties by using the substantial discretion given to the
court by law and practice; the court draws on the "non-legal" resources
in the medical and social service fields to inform and enhance its
decision-making capacity; and the court's ultimate decision has at its
core a remedial-or perhaps even preventive-purpose.27
A. Defining the Role of Family Court
1. THE TRADITIONAL QUERY
While there is near unanimity among Family Court observers that
the advantages of some form of unified court are substantial, the breadth
22. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTs LAW § 115 (a)(i), (vi) (McKinney 1998).
23. Id. § 115 (b), (e).
24. Id. § 115.
25. Babb, supra note 20, at 527; see also Edward P. Mulvey, Family Courts:
The Issue of Reasonable Goals, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49, 51 (1982) (discussing
family court unification efforts twenty years ago). Ironically, New York is one of
eleven unified Family Courts in the country, but still does not have jurisdiction over
divorce. For efforts to fully unify the New York Family Court system, see infra notes
81-82 and accompanying text.
26. WILLIAM C. GORDON, THE FAMILY COURT SYSTEM 1 (1977); Babb, supra
note 20, at 491 n.104; Mulvey, supra note 25, at 51-52. All of these factors were
considered in the creation of the Family Court in Hawaii in the mid-1960s. Gerald R.
Corbett & Samuel P. King, The Family Court of Hawaii, 2 FAM. L.Q. 32 (1968).
27. Mary Jean McDonald, The Role and Responsibility of New York's
Children's Court 2 (Jan. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In
dispensing "individualized justice," the court is also protecting the due process rights of
the litigants before it. Id. Explains Gordon, "[a]dherence to objective standards at all
stages does not show a lack of concern for persons coming before the court. Rather, it
means that the court system assures all the individuals who appear before it that they will
be judged by the same standards." GORDON, supra note 26, at 3.
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of potential authority by a judge fully exercising her discretion within
such a structure inevitably raises a question of the scope of the court's
power. This question, which has been at the heart of every effort to
create or reform Family Court, has been posed in a variety of ways.
One variation asks whether the role of the Family Court judge is
primarily adjudicative or administrative: is her primary purpose to
decide specific disputes or to manage the larger, more complex issues
that the family brings with it to the courthouse?2" A second variation
queries: if the court is assuming the larger, managerial role, is that role
primarily preventive or primarily remedial? That issue leads to two
collateral questions. First, should the court subsume some or all of the
services provided to families directly under its control, or should it
maintain the traditional division between the executive and judicial
functions? 29 Second, if the judge does assume a broader role, does this
necessarily include a leadership role for the court in the larger
community it serves?30 While these questions must be incorporated into
any discussion of Family Court reform, they confine the analysis to
28. Corbett & King, supra note 26, at 39. After describing the extensive social
services available in the Family Court in domestic violence cases, the judges
nevertheless conclude: "Our Family Court is being developed as a court utilizing the
techniques of the social services, and not as a social service agency utilizing the
authority of the law." Id.
Placement of related types of cases under one judicial roof, for greater
effectiveness, does not mean that the court should wipe out the legal
distinctiveness of each of these matters. . . . Some family court proponents
... . believe that the lines etched in substantive and procedural law
interfere with the court's ability to resolve problems and would like the court
to have broad freedom, at all stages in its proceedings, to decide what is best
for the individual (perceived, necessarily from the viewpoint of the person
making that decision).
GORDON, supra note 26, at 2.
29. McDonald, supra note 27, at 7. Family Court has often been characterized
as an exception to the bright line demarcation between judicial and administrative roles,
and this straddling of roles has been identified, as mentioned above, as one of the
inherent tensions of this special court. However the administrative role is defined for
the Family Court, it is not without parallels in many state courts which participate in the
administration of justice through such actions as regulating the legal profession,
establishing regulatory policy or procedural rules, and working on law reform efforts.
See Helen Herschkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1869-75 nn. 189-222 (2001).
30. The most vocal current advocate for the activist community judge is Leonard
P. Edwards, who writes and lectures frequently on this issue. See, e.g., Judge Leonard
P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, Juv. & FAM.
CT. J., 1992, at 1 (Vol. 43, No. 2). In New York, the most famous activist Family
Court judge was Justine Wise Polier. See NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF
WILDER: THE Epic STRUGGLE TO CHANGE FOSTER CARE 3-4 (2001).
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well-trod paths that are inevitably circular.3" Each generation of Family
Court reformers has had to find the point along the
administrative/judicial continuum that best reflected contemporary
beliefs concerning judicial roles, as well as political and fiscal realities,
while still pushing towards the reformers' own ideal point.3 2 This
determination will also have to be reached in both the conception of
model courts and the inevitable reactions to them.
2. TRYING A DIFFERENT ANALYSIS OF FAMILY COURT REFORM
Although the questions posed in the previous Section are valid, I
would prefer to posit a different question regarding Family Court
reform, one that takes account of this traditional tension but is not bound
by it: can we define the value that Family Court adds to the lives of the
families it serves?33 By defining and determining that value, we may be
able to discover whether current Family Court reform efforts-
particularly the model court movement-can create lasting, systemic
reform.
In 1953, Alfred Kahn published his extensive study of the New
York City Children's Court.34 In a chapter entitled "A Dream Still
Unrealized," Kahn summarized his own frustration with the Children's
Court:
This study has found that the New York City Children's
Court, considered by some as an illustration of what a
successful court should be, has only begun to move in the
expected direction. A minority of children are served with
both kindness and skill by those judges, probation officers, and
other staff members who have understood the purpose of a
children's court, are equipped to perform their tasks
31. "What all this means is that a family court must function as a court, both as
a matter of law and as a matter of sound policy. This does not detract from the court's
concern for an individual or from its efforts on his/her behalf." GORDON, supra note
26, at 3.
32. See, e.g., Judge Gordon's statement in 1977: "Such a family court will see
itself not just as a means of carrying out traditional legal concepts; or as a means of
using resources efficiently; or as a means of resolving important individual and societal
problems-but as all of these." GORDON, supra note 26, at 5.
33. This question was first posed by Barbara Blum, a member of the New York
State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children during a meeting to
determine the direction of the Commission's court improvement agenda in the late
1990s. The question has been kept at the forefront of the Commission's work by Nancy
Dubler, another member of the Commission, ever since.
34. ALFRED J. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK
CITY CHILDREN'S COURT (1953).
2002:331
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competently, and have at the same time had available to them
needed community resources. The majority of children before
the Court, however, receive service which does not reflect the
juvenile court movement's aspirations or the kinds of help that
fully qualified personnel with adequate community resources at
their disposal would be able to provide. For some of the
children, the Court represents a well-intentioned but
inadequately prepared, pressured group of individuals who
cannot achieve what they strive to do. For many, it is the
insensitive instrument of an indifferent or hostile social world.
Thus, in most instances, the Children's Court in New York
City fails to act as a "good parent" or as a skilled counselor;
far too often it does not even appear as a kind friend. Indeed,
it is as though an ambivalent society created a new institution
and then, not being sure about what it had wrought, permitted
old practices and failings to continue and provided so few new
resources that the institution could not flourish.3
Kahn's findings confirmed earlier analyses of the juvenile court
movement and were repeated by subsequent investigators through the
end of the twentieth century.36 Nevertheless, over its one hundred year
history, most critics sought a way to hold on to the idea that a court
created to address children's and families' issues had intrinsic value-if
they could successfully define that value.37 Twenty years ago, Edward
Mulvey posed a variation of Kahn's lament when he asked whether it
was possible to formulate any reasonable goals for a Family Court
system that would withstand "later claims of misdirected idealism" and
would "provide a more realistic appraisal of the judiciary's role in the
regulation of family problems."3" Mulvey noted that "considerations
regarding the expected effectiveness of the court in regulating family
dysfunction have never been adequately resolved," 39 and that "the
question of whether the court's attempt [to resolve family problems] will
35. Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added).
36. Babb, supra note 20, at 491-93; McDonald, supra note 27, at 5-6; Mulvey,
supra note 25, at 59-60. The failures of Family Court have also been the subject of non-
fiction book length reports, such as JOHN HUBNER & JILL WOLFSON, SOMEBODY ELSE'S
CHILDREN: THE COURTS, THE KIDS, AND THE STRUGGLE TO SAVE AMERICA'S TROUBLED
FAMILIES vii (1996).
37. McDonald, supra note 27, at 1.
38. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 49-50.
39. Id. at 52 ("The notable point regarding the recent developments in family
courts is that most reforms have focused on improving the efficiency of the court
process, while leaving the ideals of preventing family disruption and providing social
services basically unquestioned.").
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produce gain far outweighing harm is unanswered although often
assumed. "4 0 This question is often assumed, in part because so much of
the discussion around Family Court reform has focused on procedural
change. Court efficiency has been particularly central to procedural
reform efforts.4' Those procedural recommendations are usually
responses to the sense that the court is being overwhelmed by volume,
delay, and congestion. Family Court is not unusual in facing these
challenges. Court reform efforts frequently grow out of a sense of crisis
in the court system. Yet that crisis may be part of the culture of court
systems, worse at some points than at others.42 Responding to the crisis
only by rearranging the structure of the court has often proven to be
insufficient to accomplish fundamental reform.43
Creating fundamental and lasting reform requires a more
substantive response to Kahn's and Mulvey's recognitions that Family
Court has yet to define itself well enough to create value for families.
For that reason, I would like to utilize a "value-added" analysis of the
Family Court that is applicable regardless of the structural and
procedural reforms undertaken or the place along the
judicial/administrative continuum onto which a particular reform falls.
At the same time, I recognize that certain procedural reforms may
actually enhance the application of a value-added role of the court. In
looking at model court reform, for example, the interaction between this
40. Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
41. See infra Part II for a discussion of reform in the New York Family Court;
see also JUDITH S. KAYE & JOHATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, FAMILY
JUSTICE PROGRAM INITIATIVE II 2 (1998) [hereinafter FJP II] (on file with author);
Mulvey, supra note 25, at 52.
42. Harry N. Scheiber, Innovation, Resistance, and Change: A History of
Judicial Reform and The California Courts, 1960-1990, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2049, 2052
(1993). Reviewing reform efforts for the California court system, Scheiber effectively
argued that high volume, congestion, and delay are recurring problems of a court system
that will forever be under-resourced. See id. Moreover, procedural reforms, such as
judicial reassignments or new forms of case settlement processes, have had limited (and
mostly short-term) effects. Id. at 2069-70.
43. There may be myriad reasons why structural change is insufficient. Scheiber
highlighted how the local legal "culture" affects the ways in which problems are
addressed. Id. at 2053. He also pointed out that the notion that any particular change is
a "reform" is misleading: "One person's 'reform' is another's 'reactionary effort at
turning back the clock,' and a measure is not an unalloyed good simply because it
represents a new approach. Many changes that are routinely called reforms are not truly
reformative in any way but rather are better termed 'adjustments.'" Id. at 2055-56. For
a parallel discussion of social services reform efforts, see Jane Waldfogel, The New
Wave of Service Integration, 71 Soc. SERVICE REV. 463, 465, 479 (1997) (noting that
the first administrative reforms incorporating service integration ultimately failed
because there was no focus on the substantive core: reforming street-level casework
practice).
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value-added role and the structure of the model court may create a more
lasting synergy for successful reform.
B. The Value-Added Analytical Framework
The analysis I propose for the value-added role of the court begins
with a recognition that protecting the procedural due process rights of
the litigants in child welfare proceedings while determining the
sufficiency of the allegations-and, if the allegations are sufficient,
determining custody-no longer adequately defines the role of the
Family Court. While the court will always shoulder these
responsibilities, federal and state mandates have incrementally expanded
the court's role to the point where the court is now required to
determine the sufficiency of the child welfare agency's response to the
family's needs prior to, and during, the course of the child welfare
proceedings. The court actively oversees the case until a permanent
solution has been devised for the child and family-a process that can
last many years." This judicial oversight function is different from the
role of the child welfare agency, whose primary mission is "to ensure
the safety and well-being" of children through the direct provision of
assistance. 4' If this assistance is effective, the court may never be asked
to intervene. If it is not successful and the child welfare agency
determines that there is sufficient basis for asking the court to sanction
greater intervention and oversight in the parent-child relationship, this
secondary intercession by the court (beyond the due process mandates)
must have a purpose that transcends the child welfare agency's role.
Otherwise, there seems little justification in expanding the court's
oversight of the child welfare agency's actions.
The purpose that will justify the court's expanded authority-thus
adding value to the family's life-is the rigorous enforcement of the
constitutional principles that recognize the importance of children being
raised by their families and not by the state.46 These principles have
44. MARK HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING
REFORMS: ONE COURT THAT WORKS 9 (1992) (describing the judicial mandates of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and the Adoption and Safe Families Act).
The extent and quality of implementing those mandates, however, continues to be
problematic. See infra notes 55-58.
45. New York City Administration for Children's Services, Policies:
Permanency & Planning Principles, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/mainwhatwedo/
pp intro.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
46. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972). These cases built upon earlier decisions epitomized in Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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most recently been reinforced by the Supreme Court in Troxel v.
Granville,47 where after reviewing the cases that established "perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court," 41 the Court concluded: "In light of this extensive precedent, it
cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."
49
1. A COMMITMENT TO ENSURING FAMILY INTEGRITY
This commitment to ensuring family integrity must permeate the
court's oversight role for the court to be distinguished from the child
welfare agency's role. For example, prior to the court interfering with
family integrity, or allowing another state agent to involuntarily
interfere, the court has an affirmative mandate to ensure that reasonable
efforts were made to assist the family in remaining a unit and in
remaining free of unnecessary state intervention in the form of either the
child welfare system or the jurisdiction of the Family Court.' This
requirement has been incorporated into federal law through both the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) 5" and
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
.... The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture [the
child] and direct [its] destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare [the child] for additional obligations.
Id.; see also Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases n. 12
(discussing the range of explanations for the primacy of parental control in child rearing)
(forthcoming in Hofstra Law Review; on file with author). These legal and philosophical
bases for parental authority are reinforced by the psychological analysis of the family as
a functioning system. See Mulvey, supra note 25, at 54.
47. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
48. Id. at 65. While Troxel addressed the scope of judicial authority in a private
visitation dispute between a fit parent and a third party, in highlighting the constitutional
protections afforded parents, the Court expressed clear support for limiting the discretion
of courts to substitute their judgment for a parent's. Id. at 57. Acknowledging that the
judge would have had greater authority to intervene if there were a question of unfitness,
the Court never implied that this intervention would not require the judge to adhere to
the family integrity principles. Id.
49. Id. at 66.
50. An example may be illustrative. The court must determine that the child
welfare agency used "reasonable efforts" where appropriate to keep a child who is at
risk of foster care with her family. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (1994). Rigorous
enforcement of family integrity principles is likely to result in the court scrutinizing the
agency's efforts to maintain the child at home more scrupulously than if the court did not
apply these principles.
51. "[Rleasonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify families (i) prior
to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removing
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). 52 It has also been
applied to the states through statute and case law. s3
For the court to fully secure its value-added role by applying the
reasonable efforts mandate, it must be willing to use its authority not
only to accept jurisdiction over a family, but also to reject that
jurisdiction and insist that the child welfare agency either continue its
own intervention for the safety of the child and the integrity of the
family unit or leave the family alone.5 4 If the court determines that its
jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the child's protection, the court's next
obligation is to enforce rigorously its own state's standards for ultimate
removal of a child from a parent's care. This includes determining
whether that state's requirements for reunification services and planning
are being upheld, and maintaining the integrity of the family unit-even
when a child is temporarily living outside that family unit-until
sufficient facts enable the court to determine that the integrity is no
longer viable. Too often, maintaining family integrity consistent with a
child's health and safety is not treated as a primary role for the court
once a child has been placed outside the family, despite the temporary
nature of the placement and the clear requirements of the law.55 In
practice, there is often little more than a cursory review of what has
occurred in the interim period between removal and the next court
proceeding. 6  In fact, in routinely perfunctory hearings, the court
the child's home; and (ii) to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child's
home." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (Supp. V 2000) (as amended by the ASFA).
52. Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i)-(ii); Sarah H. Ramsey, The United States Child
Protective System-A Triangle of Tensions, 13 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 25, 30 (2001).
53. Ramsey, supra note 52, at 26, 29. Ramsey suggested that there may be a
constitutional basis for the provision of services before a family is disrupted, because it
would be the least intrusive intervention on the state's part; however she acknowledged
that the Court has never reconciled least restrictive family intervention with its decisions
that the government does not have an affirmative obligation to provide services as
articulated in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-
03 (1989). Ramsey, supra note 52, at 26. In any case, on state law grounds, child
protective laws routinely require the provision of services.
54. Such a tiered response parallels Jane Waldfogel's proposal of a "differential
response" by child protective authorities in initial child protection investigations. Jane
Waldfogel, Protecting Children in the 21st Century, 34 FAM. L.Q. 311, 318 (2000).
Waldfogel recommended differentiating between the most serious cases that require a
full-blown investigation and those less serious cases where a more limited service
assessment is conducted. Id.
55. In New York, for example, legislative findings and intent state: "To the
extent it is consistent with the health and safety of the child . . . the state's first
obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the
child has already left home . . . ." N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney
Supp. 2001-02).
56. MOLLY ARMSTRONG ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, NEW YORK STATE
FAMILY COURT IMPROVEMENT STUDY 23 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 VERA STUDY]
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expresses dissatisfaction or disappointment with the child welfare
agency's efforts to assist the family, but offers little more than
admonitions to do better.57 Neither the primacy of family integrity nor
the urgency of achieving stability for a child is accomplished through
these inadequate court rituals. On the contrary, by failing to follow
through on these mandates during the life of a child welfare proceeding,
the court affirmatively harms both the child and the parents." The court
fails to provide the impetus for the family and the child welfare system
to achieve reunification or, if reunification is unavailable, to obtain
alternative stability for the child.59 That is why the court must
(demonstrating that services were discussed in fewer than one-quarter of the cases
observed in New York and Bronx Counties).
57. Court orders requiring services to be provided to parents or children in the
course of a child welfare proceeding were recorded in thirty-eight percent of the New
York County proceedings and thirty-four percent of the Bronx County proceedings. Id.
at 24. Moreover, an extension of placement hearing to determine whether a child should
remain in foster care, return to her parents, or be freed for adoption, and what actions
need to be taken to accomplish the appropriate goal, took on average five minutes in
New York County and ten minutes in Bronx County. Id. at 32. New York is not alone
in the swift superficiality of its child protective proceedings. As David Herring has
demonstrated, judges routinely failed to implement both the letter and the spirit of the
AACWA:
Judges would often spend ten minutes assessing a family's progress under
the case plan, perhaps adjusting the case plan and determining the placement
for the affected child, usually for the next six months. These time
constrained hearings did not allow judges to engage in the thorough,
comprehensive review contemplated by AACWA. In fact, these hearings
did not even allow for an adequate presentation of the evidence and of the
parties' positions. What they provided was a chaotic, informal flow of
information to the judge .... The result was usually a judicial decision that
simply maintained the status quo. In fact, many orders simply read, "child
to remain in foster care, review in six months."
David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act-Hope and Its Subversion, 34
CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 329, 335-36 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
58. Despite the aspirations of AACWA, with lax federal compliance
mechanisms, children were either left at home in unsafe conditions or languished in
foster care; by 1999, 547,000 children were in foster care, more than double the number
during the early years of the AACWA. Ramsey, supra note 52, at 30.
59. Herring, supra note 57, at 342. Herring posited that ASFA is not likely to
improve the court's compliance with reasonable efforts and other permanency
requirements. Id. Without significant increases in resources, a redirection of the
resources toward prevention, and audit requirements that analyze the substance rather
than the form of compliance:
[the agency and the court will continue to have great difficulty in providing
services to troubled families in a timely and effective manner. Under such
resource-poor conditions, judges and agency personnel will perceive
aggressive permanency planning as something to avoid because public
systems deny parents a fair chance to reunify with their children.
Id. at 342.
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affirmatively recognize the assistance that it can provide to the family by
consistently enforcing the legal requirements incorporated into this
value-added mandate.
2. FAMILY SYSTEM THEORY AND ITS ROLE IN PRESERVING
FAMILY INTEGRITY
"Family system" theory, which recognizes the family as a complex
system whose malfunctioning may have multiple causes requiring
creative legal dispositions,'0 reinforces and helps to explain the value-
added role of the Family Court. This psychological theory rejects the
medical pathology model of court intervention (i.e., finding the "fault"
or "cause" of the family's problem and "fixing it" by court order) as
ineffective to accomplish both the social goals of the family and the dual
legal goals of the child welfare system to maintain families and keep
children safe.6' The family system approach provides a powerful
psychological analogy to constitutionally-based family integrity. As
Susan Brooks has written:
The current legal system is well equipped to identify an
individual child as the subject of child welfare proceedings and
to attach blame to an individual parent. Yet, there are obvious
flaws with this approach. By focusing on the identified patient
[i.e., the child], the system fails to address the needs and
interests of other children who remain in the home.
Furthermore, by "treating" the parents and patient separately,
the legal system fails effectively to facilitate reunification
between those parties. Moreover, by singling out the patient,
60. Mulvey characterized this approach as addressing the "family's best
interests," though he warned that characterization may be as troublesome as a child's
"best interests." Mulvey, supra note 25, at 57. Mulvey noted that a paradigmatic shift
must occur from a primarily individualistic focus in order for the legal system to
"address the definition and proper place of [the family] interest if it is to adopt a true
family focus." Id. at 50. For a more recent and detailed discussion of family system
theory in child welfare proceedings, see Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings: A Family Systems Approach, 5
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 951, 958 (1999).
61. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 53.
By assuming a distinguishable family disorder with an identifiable cause, the
court could be justified in ordering family treatment of that disorder without
confronting the issue of family autonomy. In short, a "medical model" has
been assumed by many advocates of family courts and the basic logic of this
approach supports the judiciary's attempt to isolate the cause of family
dysfunction and prescribe an appropriate remedy.
Id. (citations omitted).
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that child may be empowered inappropriately in terms of the
proper balance of power in the family, which requires parents
to have the authority to make important decisions for their
children. Most importantly from a family systems approach,
the legal system fails to recognize the mutual responsibility of
family members in whatever occurs in families. This
mutuality is not about blame, but rather how families function,
their strengths as well as their areas of weakness. By failing to
recognize the importance of the family unit, child welfare law,
in both its conception and its operation, undermines families'
efforts toward restoration and reunification. Finally, it
neglects a critical component of permanency for children,
which is the continuity of relationships with people who are
part of their family system, be they biological parents, aunts,
grandparents, cousins, neighbors, or close family friends. 2
Applying a family system approach in child welfare proceedings would
reinforce the legal application of family integrity unless the judge has
sufficient evidence that family unity is no longer consistent with the
child's health and safety. Moreover, the family system theory and the
legal mandate of family integrity both explicitly reject recent calls for
determining the "best interest of the child" prior to a formal court
determination of parental unfitness.63 Rather, the best interests of the
child analysis is affirmatively incorporated into family integrity until the
court has sufficient factual and legal basis to sever family integrity from
the child's best interests.' This also helps to diminish the false
62. Brooks, supra note 60, at 958.
In large part, the belief of legal advocates that utilization of psychological
theory will help isolate the underlying cause of family disruption fails to
acknowledge a paradigm shift toward interactionism presently occurring in
family theory (and in psychology in general). Instead, the predominant legal
belief in the value of psychological theory regarding families appears to be
rooted in the assumptions of a previous model.
Mulvey, supra note 25, at 54-55 (citations omitted).
63. Bruce A. Boyer & Steven Lubet, The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara:
Contemporary Lessons in The Child Welfare Wars, 45 VILL. L. REv. 245, 256 (2000)
(discussing attempts to establish the best interest of the child standard for court
intervention prior to determinations of unfitness).
64. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a
child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or family-like
bonds, 491 U.S. at 130 (reserving the question), it seems to me extremely
likely that, to the extent parents and families have fundamental liberty
interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have
these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.
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dichotomy between "parental rights" and "children's rights" by seeing
both parents and children as part of the legal family unit, even if the
child is temporarily out of the parent's custody, until the court
affirmatively determines that the parent no longer can legally serve as
parent. 65
3. THE BENEFITS OF USING THE VALUE-ADDED ANALYSIS
Consistent application of this value-added role of the court will
result in multiple benefits for families. First, it will reduce
inappropriate, seemingly benevolent discretion in a system that relies far
more heavily than other courts on predominantly individualized, fact-
based decision-making that lacks a coherent underlying theory of
families.66 Analysts of child protective proceedings have consistently
Id. If the child's immediate interests require separation from the parent, through careful
planning and casework, the state can protect the child and family integrity. See, e.g., In
re Michael B., 604 N.E.2d 122, 131 (N.Y. 1992). The Michael B. Court stated:
[Where a child has not been freed for adoption, the court must determine
whether it is nonetheless appropriate to continue foster care temporarily
... . The court is also statutorily mandated to consider the agency's plan
for the child, what services have been offered to strengthen and reunite the
family, what reasonable efforts have been made to make it possible for the
child to return to the natural home, and if return home is not likely, what
efforts have been or should be made to evaluate other options .... Finally,
the court should consider the more intangible elements relating to the
emotional well-being of the child, among them the impact on the child of
immediate discharge versus an additional period of foster care.
Id. (citations omitted).
65. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 (holding that the state may not presume, at fact-
finding stage of a parental rights termination proceeding, that the interests of the parent
and the child diverge). But "family integrity" is not "family best interests." The
former still relies on the predominant liberty interests of the parent (with, in some
circumstances, the liberty interest of the child) while the latter introduces a third interest
of the "family." As Mulvey warned, "whether the state would have constitutional
grounds to infer and then to enforce the interests of an abstract, probably nonegalitarian,
compact over the individual liberties .of the involved parties presents a thorny issue."
Mulvey, supra note 25, at 56-57.
66. Brooks, supra note 60, at 959 ("[Most judges] have no coherent mental
health theory guiding their practice .... A great number of lawyers and judges simply
rely on their own sensibilities or 'gut feelings' in child welfare cases."). Troxel presents
a good example of this reliance on personal feelings; in explaining his reasoning for
granting grandparent visitation, the Washington Superior Court judge below stated, "'I
think in most situations a commonsensical approach [is that] it is normally in the best
interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent' . . . . Troxel, 530
U.S. at 69 (citation omitted). Later the judge added:
"I look back at some personal experiences . . . . We always spen[t] as kids
a week with one set of grandparents and another set of grandparents, [and] it
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recognized that the overwhelming majority of child protective
proceedings involve the poor, and that minority families are
disproportionately over-represented in those proceedings.67 With the
value-added role, courts will more likely minimize the state's arbitrary
interference with these families' self-governance, avoiding interferences
"that have more to do with the racial, religious or cultural preferences
of the decision-maker than with legitimate concerns for the protection of
the child."68 Second, such a role will minimize what has been identified
by Peggy Cooper Davis and Gautam Barua as the "sequentiality effect"
of custodial decisions in child welfare cases.69  As a result of
sequentiality, custodial decisions made at one stage of a proceeding
reinforce later custodial decisions, regardless of their innate correctness.
An initial custodial error to leave a child within a family or to remove
the child "is more likely to be maintained or exaggerated than
reversed." 70  While sequentiality can be applicable in many kinds of
litigation, it is magnified in custodial decisions by the child development
principle that "custodial change becomes inherently and increasingly
detrimental as the existing custodial arrangement becomes more
longstanding,""1 and by some of the inherent extra-legal influences or
happened to work out in our family that [it] turned out to be an enjoyable
experience. Maybe that can, in this family, if that is how it works out."
Id. at 72 (citation omitted); see also Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminancy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226,
226-27 (1975).
67. Ramsey, supra note 52, at 27; see also RANDY HERTZ ET AL., 2 TRIAL
MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE COURT § 41.02(b) (1991); Martin
Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem that
Too Many Children Are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U, PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144-45
(1999); Jane M. Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Motherhood), 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1990, 2078 (1995). This is consistent with earlier findings. See Mulvey, supra note 25,
at 58.
68. Boyer & Lubet, supra note 63, at 255. This article provides a fascinating
and chilling analysis of late twentieth century American family integrity law in light of
the nineteenth century Mortara case, noting in particular how due process alone cannot
withstand contemporary definitions of best interests of the child without first honoring
family integrity. See id.; see also Monrad G. Paulson, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts,
and the Poor Man, 54 CAL. L. REV. 692, 696 (1966) ("Just who becomes beneficiaries
of the court's good offices seems very largely dependent upon fortuitous factors or upon
the exercise of discretion in the law enforcement processes.").
69. Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at
Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 145-46
(1995). See also Janet Weinstein's use of the Davis and Barua analysis in Never the
Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 79, 112-16 (1997).




biases in child welfare proceedings.72 Cooper and Barua identified
"status quo bias" and "skew in the assessment of risk" as major forces
in applying sequentiality in child welfare cases." They deduce that:
The status quo bias has potentially significant consequences in
child welfare decisionmaking. The existence of status quo bias
implies a tendency to maintain the current state against changes
in either direction, even in a category of cases in which change
would be optimal. To the extent that judges in child abuse
cases are vulnerable to this bias, they will be inclined to
continue an existing custodial arrangement, and they will be
inclined to do so in at least some cases in which a custodial
change is warranted.74
Addressing "skew in the assessment of risk," they identified two
principal sources of skew: (1) problems of focus and emphasis, and (2)
feedback vulnerabilies. The first includes a bundle of factors in child
welfare cases that favor intervention: the very nature of the cases that
charge parental maltreatment, the imbalance in resources between the
state and the parent affecting the quality of evidence presented to the
court, and the judges' greater fear of harm if the child remains at home
than if the child enters care.75 The second, feedback vulnerabilities,
magnifies the judge's fear of failure to intervene:
Just as judges are more likely to learn of a regrettable failure
to intervene than of a regrettable intervention, they are more
likely to receive negative informal and media feedback as a
result of a decision to leave a child in an allegedly neglectful
or abusive home. In some communities there may be feedback
in reaction to family interventions, but the specter of a
headline announcing that a child has suffered injury or death as
72. Id. at 147 (observing that influences or biases are identified without
"implying improper behavior on the part of the judge [but rather] acknowledge that rule
systems are not sufficiently rigid to predetermine all cases and that factors not referenced
in the rules will affect decisionmaking in those cases which are not predetermined by the
terms of the governing rule system").
73. Id. at 148-50. Status quo bias has been empirically identified in various
contexts. Relevant for these purposes is the finding that choice is "motivated less by
aversion to loss than by aversion to feeling, being, or seeming to be responsible for a
negative outcome .... [P]eople feel more responsible for their actions than for their
omissions." Id. at 149.
74. Id.
75. Waldfogel also identified risk aversion as a barrier to reforming social
service systems, particularly child welfare systems, "where the political costs of making
a wrong move are very high." Waldfogel, supra note 43, at 470.
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a result of being returned to its parents looms more
realistically for most judges and may cause some to deviate
from the norm of unskewed decisionmaking.76
Applying their theory of sequentiality, Davis and Barua found that
"interim decisions are more likely to err on the side of intervention" and
removal.7 If the unintended effect of sequentiality results in the wrong
children being temporarily removed in child welfares cases, the court
then has a greater responsibility to assume the value-added role in order
to rectify the imbalance created by sequentiality.7"
Finally, in addition to minimizing state intervention based on
factors such as race and poverty and curbing the effects of sequentiality,
consistent application of the value-added theory diminishes reliance on a
flood of resources into the Family Court system as a prerequisite to
fundamental change.79 Fewer cases will be brought to court, and the
76. Davis & Barua, supra note 69, at 152 (citations omitted). In November
1995, Elisa Izquierdo was killed in New York by her mother. The case received
national attention. David Van Biema, Abandoned to Her Fate, TIME, Dec. 11, 1995, at
32. Following this tragedy, many New York Family Court judges were reluctant to
return children to their parents unless they were 100% convinced of the child's safety,
fearing the attention they would receive from the media if their decision was not correct.
At the time of Elisa's death, I was the Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights
Division of the Legal Aid Society which represented the vast majority of children in
Family Court in New York City (including Elisa). In that capacity, I had numerous
discussions with attorneys and judges about this fear. See also SPECIAL CHILD WELFARE
ADVISORY PANEL, ADVISORY REPORT ON FRONT LINE AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICE 48
(2000) [hereinafter ADVISORY REPORT], available at http://www.aecf.org/child/frontline.
pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2002).
77. Davis & Barua, supra note 69, at 157.
78. Recognizing the sequentiality effect in some of the most highly contested and
publicized child welfare cases reinforces this value-added theory for family court
decision-making. This is evident in Boyer and Lubet's discussion of the cases of Baby
Richard and Elian Gonzalez, which are both examples of the sequential impact of the
court's failure to apply family integrity at initial stages of the proceedings; these cases
resulted in protracted custody battles and the children's stability being disrupted. Boyer
& Lubet, supra note 63, at 258, 285.
79. Mulvey, supra note 25, at 59 ("One of the striking aspects of family court
proposals is the reliance on adequately trained and qualified personnel and resources in
order to handle family-based problems in a professional manner."). Given the realities
of how courts operate, this is an example of what Sarason terms "the myth of unlimited
resources" :
Essentially, the general belief-general because of the number of people who
hold it and because of the number of social problems which give rise to it-is
that by an act of national will or resolve, accompanied of course by
appropriately sized expenditures, we can train as many people as are
necessary to meet a particular problem . . . . The belief is that by virtue of
money one will be able to hire enough people to provide services to eligible
people in the best way those services should be rendered .... I have never
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cases that are brought will be handled more expeditiously and
thoroughly. The potential of this assertion remains difficult for many
Family Court practitioners and judges to believe. Without looking at
current efforts in New York and elsewhere to reform Family Court, we
are unable to assess the potential of a value-added analysis in achieving
reform, nor can we determine whether the nature of current reform
efforts reinforces or rejects application of the value-added role.
II. NEW YORK FAMILY COURT REFORM
A. Building a Family Justice Program
Since 1997, the New York State Unified Court System has
embarked on an ambitious Family Justice Program (FJP) to develop
court initiatives and legislative proposals "to address the justice needs of
children and families in the New York State Family Court and Supreme
Court.""0 The first and overarching goal of the FJP was to take the final
step toward establishing a fully unified Family Court system by creating
a Family Division of the New York Supreme Court, the trial court of
general jurisdiction in New York. As with other unified court proposals
around. the country, the FJP heralded this proposal as the key solution to
simplifying the court structure and injecting "common sense" into court
practice. 8' That "common sense" was a recognition of the overlapping
nature of legal problems affecting families and the inefficiencies of
having multiple courts address those issues. Establishing a unified court
system, unlike the other goals within the FJP, requires a state
constitutional amendment that has failed to gain the necessary political
support.8 2 The greatest portion of the FJP, therefore, is designed to be
accomplished through administrative, rather than political, action. The
known a setting, old or relatively new, which did not complain that it had
inadequate numbers to do the job in the way it was conceived best to do
Avoiding the problem of limited resources and holding to the belief in
a predictable future are among the most potent factors influencing the
creation and development of a setting, and their potency is increased in
proportion to the extent that they are implicit or unverbalized.
SEYMOUR B. SARASON, THE CREATION OF SETTINGS AND THE FUTURE SocIETIEs 97, 99,
112 (1972).
80. JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs.,
FAMILY JUSTICE PROGRAM INITIATIVE I, at i (1997) [hereinafter FJP I].
81. Id. at5.
82. John Caher, Court Makeover High on Lawmakers' Agendas, in ALBANY
TIMES-UNION, 1999 LEGISLATIVE SURVIVAL GUIDE, http://www.timesunion.com/capitol/
survivalguide99/appeals.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).
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FJP begins with an explicit recognition of the uniqueness of Family
Court:
The reality is that Family Court-the court that decides
society's most difficult issues and has the most profound effect
on its litigants' lives-is not like any other court, and the
challenge to improve the manner and speed with which it
dispenses justice is similarly unique. By their very nature,
Family Court cases are not necessarily defined by a single
incident or transaction. Its judges are typically faced with an
ever-changing scenario of family circumstances-even family
members-and a family's legal difficulties are rarely confined
to a single docket in a single courthouse. Typical methods of
case management ill suit the tangled nature of Family Court
affairs, and overwhelming caseloads, inadequate resources and
the large numbers of litigants without lawyers only add to the
challenge.83
The FJP that has been developed to escape this quagmire grows out
of three interrelated strands of judicial reform efforts. The first is the
sweeping national "drug court" movement, which generally offers non-
violent, drug-addicted offenders the alternative of court-ordered drug
treatment in order to become clean and sober, and to earn dismissal of
the criminal charges.8' These courts are considerably less adversarial,
focusing more on dispositional results than adjudicating offenses, with
the district attorney, defense counsel, judge, and treatment providers
working as a team toward the goal of the defendant's sobriety and lawful
behavior. 8 The financial and human savings have been substantial, with
participants having lower drug usage rates and decreased criminal
recidivism and a concomitant savings on incarceration and treatment.86
The "experimentalist" aspects of the criminal drug court model (e.g.,
legislative identification of a problem followed by local experimentation
with collaboratively-developed and pooled information fueling that
experimentation) have been identified as key elements to this
methodology for systemic reform.' New York has been actively
83. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT Sys., FAMILY JUSTICE PROGRAM INITIATIVE Il,
at 1 (2001) [hereinafter FJP HI].
84. Wolf, supra note 5, 8-10.
85. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 852 (2000).
86. Susan K. Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-Solving Courts
Provide Meaningful Alternatives to Traditional Remedies, N.Y. ST. B.J., June 2000, at
8,9.
87. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 85, at 834.
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pursuing this model, developing more than thirty treatment courts
throughout the state. 88 The FJP explicitly acknowledges its intent "to
apply the insights gained from these criminal court innovations to the
Family Court." 89
The second strand supporting the creation of the FJP is the role of
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (National
Council), which has spearheaded an intensive agenda to reform Family
Court practice, especially in the area of child welfare.' The National
Council's reform efforts have built on changes in federal law that began
in earnest with the implementation of the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (AACWA) in 1980.9' The AACWA required state child
welfare systems to make "reasonable efforts" to prevent children from
coming into foster care and to provide services and assistance to
children and parents in order to end foster care drift and ensure
permanency for children through reunification with their parents or,
when appropriate, adoption by another family.' With this mandate
came increasing responsibility by the presiding judge in Family Court to
ensure that the "reasonable efforts" at prevention and reunification were
actually being made by the child welfare system.93 Court responsibility
shifted from solely finding parents guilty of neglect or abuse and
deciding whether to place the children in care, to supervising the
provision of services and assistance to the families who appeared in
court.' The National Council spearheaded the effort to encourage
judges to embrace this expanded judicial review authority.95  In
addition, the National Council began to advocate for the development of
Family Court judges as judicial leaders. Underlying this perspective of
88. Knipps & Berman, supra note 86, at 8-9.
89. FJP I, supra note 80, at 10.
90. See infra note 95.
91. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
93. Letter from Judge Leonard P. Edwards, Presiding Judge, Juvenile Court, to
Richard O'Neil, Director, Department of Family and Children's Services, San Jose,
California (Dec. 6, 1989), in NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,
RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES
app. C at 167 (1995) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDELINES] (describing the role of the
Family Court judge to determine whether the Department has made reasonable efforts to
enable children to remain home safely with their families and the consequences of the
Department's failure to do so).
94. Howard A. Davidson, Child Protection Policy and Practice at Century's
End, 33 FAM. L.Q. 765, 769 (1999).
95. RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 93, at 18. The Resource Guidelines are
considered the "bible" of judicial decision-making for child welfare cases. Of course,
the National Council has long struggled with Family Court reform. See, e.g., GORDON,
supra note 26 (a monograph developed to train Family Court judges under the auspices
of the National Council, formerly the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges).
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judicial leadership is the belief that Family Court is going to function
effectively and with successful outcomes only if Family Court judges
embrace the leadership skills necessary to be vocal and creative systemic
managers and productive adjudicators." Leadership training is
increasingly incorporated into the Council's publications and
recommendations. 97 Judges who personify this new leader frequently
lecture and publish about the effectiveness of this role. 9 They also
travel the country, encourage other judges to assume highly visible
community roles, speak out on the needs of Family Court to lawmakers,
the media, and the public, and assume ever greater administrative
oversight of service providers connected to the court. 99  This role
harkens back to the earliest days of Family Court when many of the
Progressive era reformers believed that a key role for the judge was to
be a leader in developing and supervising the provision of community
resources to children."l° Not surprisingly, this expansive role has not
been uniformly embraced. For many judges whose formative legal
training avowed a narrow adjudicatory role, the incremental judicial
review requirements of the AACWA, and more recently, the Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASFA), are already viewed distrustfully. A
greater administrative and managerial role is even more unsettling. 10'
The final strand is the local convergence of the first two strands in
New York's Chief Judge, Judith Kaye. Judge Kaye has embraced and
championed the role of judge as hands-on leader.'6°  Working in
96. See, e.g., HARDIN, supra note 44, at 90.
97. See, e.g., PERMANENCY PLANNING FOR CHILDREN DEP'T, NAT'L COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN: JUDICIAL
LEADERSHIP & JUDICIAL PRACTICE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1998),
http://www.pppncjfcj.org/TABulletins/Number_6/TA-5_Body.pdf.
98. Edwards, supra note 30, at 1.
99. In addition to Judge Leonard Edwards, supra note 93, Judge Richard
Fitzgerald of Louisville, Kentucky, Judge David Grossmann of Cincinnati, Ohio, and
Judge Nancy Salyers of Chicago, Illinois, are examples of judges who exemplify this
judicial role. Systemic reform, however, may not rely solely on such leadership. See
Mulvey, supra note 25, at 50.
100. McDonald, supra note 27, at 7. This community role was never entirely
abandoned. See GORDON, supra note 26, at 5, 10; KAHN, supra note 34, at 122-23.
101. In April 1998, the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on
Justice for Children sponsored a two-day forum for Family Court Judges entitled
"Judicial Leadership in Child Welfare." As a member of the Commission and of the
forum planning committee, I knew that the forum was intended to reinforce the idea that
judges needed to become judicial leaders if significant improvements for children in
child welfare proceedings were going to be achieved. During the course of the forum,
however, some judges either openly or privately disagreed with the premise that this was
an appropriate role for a Family Court judge.
102. E.g., Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 11, 1999, at 13.
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conjunction with the state courts' research and development arm, the
Center for Court Innovation, she has created a wide range of court
alternatives-community courts, drug treatment courts, domestic
violence courts-to address, through judicial structures, deep seated
societal issues which frequently result in court intervention. In relation
to Family Court reform, for the last dozen years, Judge Kaye has
chaired the New York State Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice
for Children (Commission), a quasi-think tank, quasi-action network of
statewide leaders grappling with children's issues. 3 The Commission
has spearheaded specific efforts, such as the creation of children's
centers in courts and the widespread dissemination of information on
children's health issues to Family Court personnel, but it has also
considered the steps necessary to create lasting reform in Family
Court. 104 The Commission embarked on a series of research activities
that inspired some of the components of the FJP.'05 Moreover, it has
been designated to administer the federally-funded State Court
Improvement Project for the court system.'0 6 Judge Kaye's commitment
to Family Court reform also resulted in a resolution adopted by the
Conference of Chief Justices that established a Statement of Principles
Regarding Children and Families (Statement). 7  The Statement
encompassed provisions urging that children and family issues be given
high priority within state court systems.' 8 Most compelling, though,
was the recognition by the chief justices that "our personal commitment
and leadership" is needed to ensure that children and families are best
served by the court system."19
These three strands of judicial reform-prototypical drug treatment
courts, national Family Court judicial leadership, and a Chief Judge
determined to reform Family Court-set the stage for the FJP proposals.
Before turning to the specifics of the FJP proposals, it is necessary to
review the context in which those proposals were made. Reformers,
while always imagining successful systemic change, cannot be
103. The Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children, http://www.
courts.state.ny.us/pjcjc/index.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., 1997 VERA STUDY, supra note 56; PERMANENT JUDICIAL COMM'N
ON JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, FIVE YEAR REPORT, 9-12 (1996), http://www.
courts. state.ny.us/pjcjc/bklt2.pdf.
106. Id. at 9.
107. NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CONFERENCE OF
CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 21: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES (2001), http://www.pppncjfcj.org/html/chiefjustices-ccj resolutions.html (last
visited Mar. 14, 2002). Judge Kaye served as the Chair of the Courts, Children and
Family Committee that proposed the resolution.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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successful unless they reflect the complexity of the entity being changed
and the barriers to achieving reform. This is true with the Family Court
and its component parts as it is with any other complex organization."'
What follows is a brief description of child welfare practice in New
York City Family Court at the turn of the twentieth century.
B. Current Family Court Practice
In 1999, two years after the initial phase of the FJP was introduced
and during the FCTP's second year in existence, 31,973 original child
protective petitions and extension of placement child protective petitions
were filed in New York City."' While the total number of children in
foster care continued its steady decline since the creation in 1996 of the
Administration for Children's Services (ACS),"' dipping below 40,000
for the first time in decades, approximately 12,700 children were subject
to new child protective or voluntary placement proceedings, which could
result in foster care, in 1999.11' Children still remained in foster care
for an average of four years, significantly above the national average. 1 4
In thousands of child protective cases heard in Family Court in 1999, no
attorney was assigned to represent the parent or other adult respondents
in the cases, despite constitutional and statutory mandates requiring
indigent parents to be assigned counsel."1 5 Child protective cases where
counsel was assigned took on average 220 days to reach disposition.'
16
Most of the attorneys who represented these parents carried extremely
heavy caseloads, frequently juggling over one hundred cases at a time."17
Over forty percent of the attorneys spent, on average, fewer than five
hours on out-of-court work-such as interviewing and counseling
clients, pursuing discovery, preparing for hearings, proposing
dispositional alternatives, or negotiating settlements-on cases that
110. Jane M. Spinak, The Role of Strategic Management Planning in Improving
the Representation of Clients: A Child Advocacy Example, 34 FAM. L.Q. 497, 507
(2000).
111. Aff. of Jane M. Spinak in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction 284, N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State of New York (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2001) (No. 102987/00) [hereinafter Spinak Affidavit].
112. ACS is an independent child welfare agency within New York City
government.
113. Administration for Children's Services, ACS Update Annual Report 2001:
Five Year Trends, at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/acs/pdf/update_5year.pdf (last
visited March 18, 2002).
114. Unfinished Business, supra note 16, at 10.






averaged over seven months to reach a final disposition."' Judges
assigned to determine these cases in recent years may hear between
thirty and seventy cases each day.' 19
Observing Family Court cases during this same year, the Special
Child Welfare Panel (Marisol Panel) of national child welfare experts,
created as part of the settlement in Marisol v. Guiliani2° to monitor the
reform plans and practices of ACS, reported that a significant
impediment to reforming child welfare practices in New York was the
role of the Family Court.' The Marisol Panel highlighted nine major
observations about Family Court practice in New York City that have a
"profound impact on the prospect of children and families in New
York's child welfare system, and the likelihood for success of ACS's
reform efforts":22
1) Pervasive delay fueled by repeated adjournments without
substantive determinations being made;
2) Insufficient compliance with basic norms of professional
behavior (e.g., caseworkers being ill prepared or failing to
attend court proceedings);
3) Vast amounts of time spent waiting because most cases are
scheduled for 9:30 a.m.;
4) Insensitivity to families who have no privacy to consult with
caseworkers or attorneys or, even more disturbing, the routine
practice of court insiders streaming through the courtroom
during proceedings;
5) A woefully inadequate system of representation for parents;
6) An unusually excessive focus on parental behavior and guilt
rather than the child's needs and best interests and the family's
capacity for reunification;
7) Insufficient attention to risk assessment as a guide to
determining the current capacity of parents to care for their
children;
8) Insufficient attention to critical legal dictates including the
detailed and mandatory AACWA and ASFA reasonable efforts
and permanency requirements; and,
9) Judges seeing themselves as powerless victims of the overall
system, unable to hold the child welfare system accountable or
118. Id. 255.
119. JULIA VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT:
COURT USER PERSPECTIVES 1 (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter 2000 VERA STUDY]
120. 185 F.R.D. 152, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
121. ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 76, at 44-48.
122. Id. at 44.
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to ensure justice to children and families, rather than as
powerful change agents."'
While some of these issues are tied to procedural inefficiencies and
insufficient resources, the Marisol Panel was far more concerned with
the underlying cultural meaning of these observations. A clear message
is sent to families when they are kept waiting all day in overcrowded
and inhospitable courthouses only to have their cases adjourned
repeatedly because the professionals responsible for these cases are not
prepared or present, or because they have ignored the earlier orders of
the court. Such circumstances suggest that neither the court nor the
other component parts of the child welfare system is committed to
achieving stability or permanency for them.
These alarming observations were, unfortunately, consistent with
multiple recent studies addressing, in part, the role of Family Court in
the resolution of child welfare issues."' The Heidt study, for instance,
noted the lack of continuity among caseworkers and attorneys in child
welfare cases, limited preparation for hearings or exploration of out-of-
court resources and services, little formal lawyering during hearings,
failure to file petitions in a timely manner, frequent and lengthy
adjournments, and failure to comply with court orders. 2 5 Delving more
deeply into what actually occurs in court, the 1997 Vera Study
concluded that in the key area of determining whether agencies are
making "reasonable efforts" to prevent or terminate foster care
placement and aid in family reunification, scant inquiry into these efforts
was made in over half the cases." 6 This study identified reasonable
efforts in four categories: family visitation, placement alternatives,
123. Id. at 44-45. For a discussion about the Marisol Panel's recognition of the
potential of model courts assisting in court reform, see infra note 184.
124. I have chosen to focus on studies done during the second half of the 1990s
during the same period that Family Court reform was being proposed in New York
State. Some of these studies were commissioned by the Permanent Judicial Commission
on Justice for Children in order to assist in the statewide reform effort. See, e.g., 2000
VERA STUDY, supra note 119; 1997 VERA STUDY, supra note 56; Jane Heidt, Survey of
Key Child Welfare Actors in the Court (Mar. 1, 1996) (unpublished study, on file with
author); see also FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY OF
THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT (1997); MARK GREEN & CHILD PLANNING &
ADVOCAcY Now (C-PLAN), JUSTICE DENIED: THE CRISIS IN LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF
BIRTH PARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS (2000) [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
125. Heidt, supra note 124, at 1-2. Heidt's study was based on a state-wide
survey of key actors in child welfare cases except for judges; every county but one
responded with a seventy-five percent response rate. Id.




services, and permanency planning.' 27 In general, there was inquiry into
at least one of these factors in fewer than half the cases, and only thirty-
eight percent of the judges asked about compliance with their orders and
their outcomes.2' In investigating the lack of counsel for parents in
Family Court proceedings, the Justice Denied study situated this lack of
counsel in the larger iealm of Family Court dysfunction.'29 As one
Family Court judge noted, "if representation is inadequate, then the
entire court is inadequate. The court culture accepts delays,
adjournments, and being unprepared . . . . With so few resources,
sloppiness is accepted. nI30
C. The Challenge of FJP Reform Efforts
The problems facing Family Court appear to fall into two
categories. The first-and most easily identifiable-encompasses the
congestion, delay, and lack of resources that typically compel reform
efforts. The second is even more elusive and formidable. What the
Marisol Panel and other observers identified was a cultural crisis in the
court, exacerbated by the overwhelming numbers, but not necessarily a
product of them: the court and its participants seem to have lost their
way. Neither legal nor social service mandates are being routinely
accomplished in a setting that fails to display sufficient understanding of
or sensitivity to the needs and interests of the families being served.'
The FJP must be able to address both categories if it is truly a blueprint
for systemic reform.
The FJP has seen three phases since 1997 that have included
recommendations related to child welfare proceedings. In addition to
the general call for a unified court with a family division, Phase I
declared that to respond to the "epidemic" in child welfare cases, "the
court system is taking the lead through a targeted approach to neglect
and abuse," by introducing the idea of "specialized treatment of
127. 1997 VERA STUDY, supra note 56, at 21.
128. Id. at 21-22.
129. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 124, at 34.
130. id.
131. Gordon wrote:
A court can project concern about the individuals coming before it in
countless other ways, without sacrificing objective standards in its decision-
making role. At each point of contact, from the notice that a witness or
accused receives, to his/her reception upon entrance to the courthouse, to the
waiting rooms, to the timeliness of proceedings, to the procedure followed in
the fact finding and any dispositional hearing, to the concern mixed with
firmness of any probationary period, and so on, the court can demonstrate
respect and concern for each individual involved.
GORDON, supra note 26, at 3.
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cases." '3 Overall, this specialized treatment was intended to result in
more efficient, expeditious and comprehensive adjudication of cases.13 1
These goals are reinforced in Phase II, where the change "reaches into
the heart of Family Court operations"'34 and "fundamentally changes the
way the court conducts its business in order to ensure that the justice
needs of children and families are met on a daily basis." 13  For child
welfare proceedings, this fundamental change encompassed two
strategies. The first-the predominant strategy in Phases I and II-
continued the traditional court reform paradigm of trying "to reduce
backloads and expedite handling of all proceedings" by creating more
efficient judicial mechanisms for case resolutions. 36 The second was
the introduction of Family Treatment Courts intended "in appropriate
cases [to allow] parents [to] receive the treatment necessary for family
preservation and unification."' 37 The introduction of Family Treatment
Courts heralded a melding of traditional reform mechanisms and
something more: an affirmative commitment "to provide coherent,
integrated responses to the needs of drug-addicted parents and their
children. " 3' This substantive commitment to family unification was
reinforced by the methodology chosen to accomplish the goal.
As described earlier, the Family Treatment Court-New York's
first model court effort-reflects the basic model court standards created
by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.'39 The
court started with the premise that the judge assumes an active
leadership role to coordinate the creation of the procedures the court will
use, to identify and secure the services that will be available to the
participants, and to monitor the cases from beginning to end through
case conferences and, oftentimes, frequent court appearances. 1  The
judge, nevertheless, is part of a case team that includes all of the
participants in the system who are working together to determine the
goals of the court and the management processes to accomplish those
goals. "' Such team case management recognizes the socio-legal
132. FJP I, supra note 80, at 9.
133. FJP III, supra note 83, at Introduction.
134. FJP II, supra note 41, at 5.
135. Id. at i.
136. FJP III, supra note 83, at 4.
137. FJP I, supra note 80, at 11.
138. Id. at 10.
139. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
140. MARY MENTABERRY, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OJJDP FACT SHEET No. 90: MODEL COURTS
SERVE ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 1 (Jan. 1999).
141. Wolf, supra note 5, at 7. In the case of the treatment court, this included
creating the criteria for screening cases for eligibility, determining whether admission to
the treatment court would require waiving certain due process rights, and having court
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complexity of family crises, the inability of traditional adversarial
processes alone to address continuing family dynamics, and the need for
multi-disciplinary problem solving approaches. 42 At the same time, all
of the participants have to assess their professional ethical obligations to
determine how their clients might be affected by participation in a model
court that has different requirements than the rest of the court system.'43
These requirements include early and active intervention by the court,
access to and acceptance of appropriate services, and continuous
monitoring by the case management team led by the presiding judge.'"
The inclusion of the Family Treatment Courts and the other model
courts in the FJP introduced a potentially more radical approach to
reform through their substantive commitment to the family and their
procedural mechanisms to achieve the goals of the value-added role I
earlier defined for the court. FJP Phase III expanded the use of these
model courts and others, such as dedicated domestic violence parts
throughout the state.'45 Preliminary data suggests that some of the New
York model courts contain the kernels for systemic reform. 4' What
personnel take on some of the case management duties usually performed by child
welfare agency personnel. Id.
142. Weinstein, supra note 69.
143. Wolf, supra note 5, at 11. The treatment court was created while I was
Attorney-in-Charge of the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society (JRD),
which represents children in most of the child welfare cases in New York City.
Extensive discussions were held at JRD about the role of the child's lawyer in a
treatment part that minimizes the adversarial process and requires parents and children to
waive certain procedural rights. Participants also worried about developing the skills for
new methods of problem-solving, such as case conferencing or mediation, that model
courts embrace.
144. Intensive and early intervention is intended to capitalize on the family crisis
that precipitated agency and then court action by, in essence, acting before it is too late.
This is in marked contrast to the lack of supervision by the court in the studies discussed
supra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
145. FJP III, supra note 83, at i-iv.
146. In the New York County Model Court in 1999, four times as many child
protective cases reached disposition within ninety days as compared to the regular child
protective court parts. Sara P. Schechter, Family Court Case Conferencing and Post-
Dispositional Tracking: Tools for Achieving Justice for Parents in the Child Welfare
System, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 n.4 (2001). By the end of six months, the
Model Part had reached disposition in almost 93% of its cases while only 38.4% of the
rest of the county's child protective cases had reached disposition. Id. at 428. There
were some other significant outcomes differences as well during that year: 46% of
children were placed compared to 58% in the rest of the child protective parts, id. at 430
n.8; 24% of the cases were either dismissed, withdrawn, or adjourned in contemplation
of dismissal compared to 13%, id. at 430 n.10; and the median stay in foster care was
only 4.6 months in 1999 compared to the twenty-seven month length of stay calculated
in 1998 for the rest of New York City. Id. at 430. Nevertheless, the number of
children released to their parents or other relatives was almost identical in the Model
Court and the rest of the child protective court parts. Id. at 430 n.9. For data from the
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transforms those kernels into fields (rather than hothouse strains that fail
outside their rarified atmosphere) will have to be their substantive goals,
not their procedural mechanisms. A review of the current nationwide
model court efforts, however, provides only tentative optimism that
these substantive value-added goals are being pursued.
III. MODEL COURTS NATIONWIDE
A. Learning by Experience
To consider whether model courts have the potential to assume a
"value-added" role for children and families, I have reviewed what the
courts say to the public about their efforts. These descriptions provide a
starting point for analyzing what the courts themselves state they are
trying to accomplish and whether that includes the value-added role that
I have identified.'47 The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges' Permanency Planning for Children Department
(NCJFCJ/PPCD) has created a web site that highlights the Child Victims
Act Model Courts Project, which has been funded by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP). 4 s Each of the model courts has a profile on the
web site that highlights, in varying degrees, its background, initial goals
(with successes and failures), current goals, lessons learned, and advice
to other courts. 14
9
FCTP, see supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text, and infra notes 186-93 and
accompanying text.
147. In a forthcoming article, I will examine whether some of the model courts
have accomplished the goals they are espousing and whether those goals reflect
fundamental change.
148. Permanency Planning Dep't, Nat'l Council for Juvenile & Family Court
Judges, Victims Act Model Court Sites [hereinafter 2000 STATUS REPORT], http:lwww.
pppncjfcj.org/html/modelcourts. html (last visited Apr. 12, 2002). Ironically, the title
of the Act is in sharp contrast to the spirit of the endeavor, which does not view children
as "victims" but rather as in need of assistance so that they can safely remain part of
their families or, if that is not possible, in another safe and permanent place. Note that
the model court web site has changed since the writing of this Article; while the web site
currently posts data for 2000, this Article primarily cites data from the 1999 web site,
which is now compiled into an Adobe Acrobat document and available on-line. See
supra note 155.
149. There are currently twenty-two model courts with accessible information
posted on the Victims Act Model Court web site: Alexandria, Virginia; Buffalo, New
York; Charlotte, North Carolina; Chicago, Illinois; Cincinnati, Ohio; Des Moines,
Iowa; El Paso, Texas; Honolulu, Hawaii; Indianapolis, Indiana; Louisville, Kentucky;
Los Angeles County, California; Miami, Florida; Nashville, Tennessee; Newark, New
Jersey; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Portland, Oregon; Reno,
Nevada; Salt Lake City, Utah; San Jose, California; Tucson, Arizona; and Washington,
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In compiling this information, the model courts have provided
Family Court judges and practitioners nationwide with valuable
information about their intentions, their efforts to realize those
intentions, and their reflections on those efforts. 50 Given the range of
jurisdictions serving as model courts, no jurisdiction can simply dismiss
the lessons of the model courts as irrelevant because of demographics.
On the contrary, the similarities that many of the model courts
experience, provide useful information, regardless of their
demographics. By willingly discussing what have been labeled
"stumbling blocks" to accomplishments on the court web sites, the
model courts have acknowledged the complexity and difficulty inherent
in any reform effort. Equally important for an analysis of whether the
model courts have value-added potential is what the model courts choose
to identify as their substantive goals and the impact of those choices.
The model courts initiative is described by its funder, OJJDP, as "a
nationwide effort to improve how courts handle child abuse and neglect
cases, [that] is helping children spend less time in foster care and
resulting in earlier resolution of cases in dependency courts." 5' The
model courts are part of the larger effort by the NCJFCJ/PPCD "to
educate judges and other practitioners on the need to expedite secure
safe permanent placements for all maltreated children, either by making
it possible for them to safely stay with or return to their own families or
by finding them safe adoptive homes." 52 The model court description
also includes other key elements seen as essential for success:
interdisciplinary training and technical assistance for all youth-serving
professionals using the NCJFCJ's Resource Guidelines as a blueprint for
improving court practice; identifying "lead" judges to mobilize all the
relevant players within their jurisdictions; developing programs that can
be seen as easily replicable in other jurisdictions; piloting innovative
alternative dispute resolution methods; and sharing information locally
and nationwide through enhanced data systems.' 53
A number of issues are immediately apparent when the profiles of
the model courts are reviewed. First is the recognition by every model
court of the difficulty of achieving systemic change. Second is the
D.C. Id. Zuni, New Mexico is also a model court site but does not have posted
information as of January 2002. Id.
150. Whether the court has actually done what it says it meant to do and/or
achieved its intentions cannot be analyzed through its words alone, but requires
qualitative analysis.
151. MENTABERRY, supra note 140, at 1.
152. Id. This description of the model courts is fully consistent with the value-
added role for Family Court as it clearly incorporates the basic belief in family integrity
into its core.
153. Id.
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emphasis on procedural goals that address administrative and judicial
efficiency. Third is the paucity of discussion by many of the model
courts around substantive goals in general and, in particular, goals that
reinforce the value-added role of Family Court that is so clearly present
in the blueprint Resource Guidelines that every model court is using."
Each model web site contains sections on lessons learned and
advice to other courts. Many of the findings in these sections are so
consistent from court to court that they provide the best overall
framework for analyzing each court's difficult experience in managing
change. Most of the courts recognized that full cooperation,
collaboration, and communication among all the stakeholders in the
family court and child welfare systems are essential change elements.
This requires every part of the system to work together to identify
issues, share information, and try solutions. For systems that have
rarely made these efforts, patience for outlasting resistance to change
then becomes a crucial component. All of the courts became aware of
how long change processes and reform efforts can take."'5 The courts
consistently identify how additional information can assist the court in
the change process. Information may be data collection,'56 sharing ideas
locally or with other model courts,' keeping better records,'
developing consistent practice guidelines,' 59 or meeting regularly."°
154. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
155. The model court web site for Cincinnati, Ohio declares: "Additionally it is a
challenge to foster an environment of change when you are faced with resistance due to
well-entrenched perceptions and practices." PERMANENCY PLANNING DEP'T, NAT'L
COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETIN:
CHILD VICTIMS ACT MODEL COURTS PROJECT STATUS REPORT 1999 (Christine L. Bailey
et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter 1999 STATUS REPORT], http://www.pppncjfcj.org/pdf/
model-court status_report.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2002).
156. Salt Lake City, Utah: "Of primary importance is the need to define the data
so that the Model Court can compare the information compiled and accurately report its
status." Id. at 161.
157. San Jose, California: "We have learned that most Model Courts have
excellent programs going and that each does them in its own way. We have learned that
we can 'steal' ideas from other court systems, but that we have to adapt them to our own
environment." Id. at 174.
158. Chicago, Illinois: "Keep records! You can learn a lot about your court, what
works and what needs to be fixed, by keeping track of cases in a systemic way." Id. at
57.
159. Louisville, Kentucky: "Courts should develop guidelines and expectations
for guardian ad litem practice with required continuing legal education." Id. at 100.
160. Buffalo, New York: "Make sure that you include a wide group of
stakeholders and involve them as early as possible in the process. Hold regular
stakeholders meetings." Id. at 35.
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B. The Focus on Procedural Reform
Overwhelmingly, these model courts show a desire to achieve
administrative and procedural reform. Jurisdictions developing initial
goals between 1995 and 1999 and additional goals in 2000 all
highlighted their administrative and procedural goals. These included
developing information systems,' improving hearings or other court
administrative processes,"' creating a unified Family Court,' 63 and
incorporating alternative dispute resolution processes into child welfare
proceedings." A vast majority of the model courts identified training
and collaboration as essential for achieving all of the other goals.'65
Even the goals that could be seen as more substantive in nature-
facilitating adoption-utilized the language of efficiency and
effectiveness to describe the efforts." This parallels many earlier court
reform efforts. 167
The predominantly procedural focus of the model court reforms,
combined with the complexities the courts identified in working with
stakeholders to accomplish any meaningful change, present a significant
challenge to achieving substantive goals. When the model courts
address substantive goals, some inferences can be drawn by what goals
they identify or achievements they highlight. The substantive goal that
clearly engages most of the courts is adoption. All but one of the model
courts has posted the number of adoptions completed within a set time
frame. 161 In contrast, only eight of the courts count the number of family
161. Buffalo, New York, id. at 25; Charlotte, North Carolina, id. at 46;
Cincinnati, Ohio, id. at 69; El Paso, Texas, id. at 74, 80; Miami, Florida, id. at 108;
New Orleans, Louisiana, id. at 200; Portland, Oregon, id. at 144; Reno, Nevada, id. at
156; San Jose, California, id. at 175; and Tucson, Arizona, id. at 179.
162. Charlotte, North Carolina, id. at 41; New Orleans, Louisiana, id. at 200-01;
Newark, New Jersey, id. at 129, 138; Portland, Oregon, id. at 144; and San Jose,
California, id. at 170.
163. El Paso, Texas, id. at 80; New Orleans, Louisiana, id. at 198; Portland,
Oregon, id. at 149; and San Jose, California, id. at 175.
164. Buffalo, New York, id. at 25; Charlotte, North Carolina, id. at 39; Chicago,
Illinois, id. at 48; Cincinnati, Ohio, id. at 63; El Paso, Texas, id. at 80; Indianapolis,
Indiana, id. at 189; Louisville, Kentucky, id. at 100; Miami, Florida, id. at 104, 108;
Nashville, Tennessee, id. at 113; Newark, New Jersey, id. at 129; New Orleans,
Louisiana, id. at 200; Portland, Oregon, id. at 143; Reno, Nevada, id. at 151; Salt Lake
City, Utah, id. at 161; San Jose, California, id. at 169; and Tucson, Arizona, id. at 179.
165. All of the sites except Los Angeles, California explicitly identified training
and collaboration.
166. Buffalo, New York includes an extensive description of the procedural
changes necessary to facilitate adoptions. Id. at 29-32.
167. See Scheiber, supra note 42, at 2060 n.30.
168. Los Angeles, California did not include this statistic. 1999 STATUS REPORT,
supra note 155, at 190.
2002:331 Adding Value to Families 365
reunifications during the same time frame.' 69 Expediting adoptions is
the explicit goal of eight courts, while finding reunification goals is
more elusive. 7° San Jose, California and Chicago, Illinois developed
mission statements that recognize both child protection and family
preservation values.' They equally share a more nuanced recognition
of the primacy of family integrity by focusing efforts on prevention and
reunification.'72 El Paso, Texas, explicitly set as a goal reunification
efforts called "Familias Primero" to use family group conferencing
concepts to strengthen families.'73 Miami, Florida, began with the
understanding that family reunification was a primary goal and actually
had to accept that not meeting other permanency goals would not be
considered failures. 174  In establishing a drug court, Reno, Nevada,
sought "to assist in rehabilitation and reunification efforts directed at
families affected by drug abuse." 75  Other courts are less explicit or
address family integrity issues much later in their processes. For
example, in developing a drug treatment court as a 2000 goal, Charlotte,
North Carolina, identified lack of treatment as diminishing the chances
169. Charlotte, North Carolina, id. at 38; Cincinnati, Ohio, id at 59; El Paso,
Texas, id. at 70; Honolulu, Hawaii, id. at 81; New Orleans, Louisiana, id. at 195;
Newark, New Jersey, id. at 126; Reno, Nevada, id. at 150; and Tucson, Arizona, id. at
177.
170. Expediting adoptions is an explicit goal of Buffalo, New York, id. at 31;
Cincinnati, Ohio, id. at 63; Louisville, Kentucky, id. at 100; Newark, New Jersey, id.
at 129, 138; Portland, Oregon, id. at 144; Reno, Nevada, id. at 151; and Salt Lake City,
Utah, id. at 163.
171. Chicago, Illinois: "To protect every child's right to a safe, permanent,
nurturing home and to strengthen families in crisis, treating all with dignity, respecting
diversity, and valuing each child as our own." Id. at 51. San Jose, California: "To
protect children, preserve families and provide permanency for children while treating
all with dignity, respecting diversity, and valuing each child as our own." Id. at 169.
172. For example, Chicago, Illinois, explicitly identifies on-site availability of
services as providing "the family with the optimum chance for reunification where
appropriate." Id. at 54. San Jose's creation of a drug court developed, in part, out of
the recognition that substance abuse services were not available for mothers with their
children. Id. at 171. Given that the efforts of Cincinnati, Ohio's Hamilton County
Juvenile Court occurred much earlier, I am not including that model court in a
comparative discussion. See Hardin, supra note 44.
173. El Paso, Texas: "Although family group conferencing was originally
developed as a diversion strategy, the El Paso Model Court intends to expand the
concept to reunify families as part of a plan to strengthen family structures after legal
case closures." 1999 STATUS REPORT, supra note 155, at 76.
174. Miami, Florida: "The Model Court team reaffirmed success as providing
permanency on a timely basis, and acknowledged that permanency is not always
reunification and that sometimes-despite skilled social work intervention and legal
representation-parents are unable to resume their parental role." Id. at 106.
175. Reno, Nevada: "The Family Drug Court Program utilizes a strength-based
approach in helping families develop and strengthen the skills necessary to develop
responsible, drug-free and alcohol-free homes for their children." Id. at 151.
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for reunification.'76 Tucson, Arizona, came to a similar conclusion
about family visitation practices and developed significantly improved
and expanded visitation policies for families.'77  Nevertheless,
identifying family integrity as a core substantive goal remains an
emergent process for these courts.
Within New York, the Buffalo Model Court Project focused
significantly on expediting adoption during its first eighteen months
through its "Spring Into Permanency" project."7 ' The project fully
engaged the joint efforts of the Erie County Family Court
Administrative Judge and the Erie County Commissioner of Social
Services. Through their leadership, a multi-disciplinary team approach
was brought to solving the problem of backlogged adoptions.179 By
creating this team model, which has expanded to include a full array of
stakeholders in the child welfare and Family Court systems, this model
court is poised to apply the lessons of team building to the full range of
child protective cases.80 As with many other model courts around the
country, however, the court's public language continues to lack attention
to the role of the court in preventing family break-up or expediting
reunification, even as it brings some of the family systems procedural
methods, such as mediation and case conferencing, to managing the
child protective cases. 181
176. Charlotte, North Carolina: "ASFA's time lines make it imperative that
substance abusing parents begin treatment almost immediately after their children come
into custody if they have any hope of re-unification." Id. at 44.
177. Tucson, Arizona: "Standard visitation procedures have offered families one
visit per week for a maximum of two hours in length. The entire Model Court working
group realized that this was not appropriate for the reunification of families." Id. at
162.
178. The court achieved significant improvements in expediting adoptions over
this time period. Id. at 29-32.
179. Id. I have been present at numerous meetings of the Permanent Judicial
Commission on Justice for Children where Judge Sharon Townsend and Commissioner
Deborah Merrifield have discussed their creative and successful collaboration.180. Id. at 25. Moreover, this court has adopted many of the key elements of the
model court movement: interdisciplinary training and technical assistance, using "lead"
judges to mobilize support, piloting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and
sharing information locally and nationally. Id. at 24; see also supra notes 152-53 and
accompanying text.
181. The updated version of the Buffalo web site contains the newest version of
the Buffalo posting on the National Council Model Court site and differs considerably
from the 1999 Report. See 2000 STATUS REPORT, supra note 148, at 22-41. At a recent
presentation to the NYS Permanent Judicial Commission on Justice for Children on Feb.
20, 2002 at which I was present, Buffalo Family Court Judge Janice Rosa discussed how
the use of mediation, case conferencing, and frequent court reviews was changing the
culture of communication between the parents and other family members and the court
and child welfare system personnel by increasing the respect everyone had for each
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C. Aiming for Lasting Reform: The Necessity of Getting to Substance
While there is no question that all of the model courts have
struggled valiantly to improve the court system for the families they
serve and that for some of the courts the highlighted, detailed procedural
reforms have had and will continue to have important substantive
results, it is disturbing that so few of the courts discuss their substantive
goals, other than adoption, more explicitly or at all. The paucity of
discussion about family integrity-in the form of preventing children
entering care or seeking their swift reunification with their families if
possible-is especially disturbing. Not only does it conflict with the
constitutional and statutory mandates described in Part I above, but it is
also in direct contradiction to the key principles underlying the Resource
Guidelines that form the blueprint for the model courts. While always
assuring a child's safety first, these principles list "avoiding unnecessary
separation of children and families," and "reunification" as the first two
principles."2 Only when these unification principles cannot be achieved
do the guidelines address the principle of developing alternative
permanency plans.'83
Because many of the model courts have not focused on substantive
goals that are consistent with the mandates of family integrity
highlighted in the Resource Guidelines, the probability that model courts
will create sustainable reform is severely jeopardized. First, as
discussed in Part I, reforms constructed only around administrative or
procedural goals have had a history of limited success. The remarkable
potential of the model court movement should not be limited by the
primacy of efficiency or administrative restructuring, nor considered
possible only with additional resources or reduced caseloads.'S4 Second,
if Family Court is going to create more significant, sustainable reform,
it must rigorously apply the substantive goals that form the basic
construction of the model court movement. Those goals capture the
value-added potential for Family Court that reformers have previously
other. The court was becoming the place where important decisions were being made
by everyone involved in the case.
182. RESOURCE GUIDELINES, supra note 93, at 12-13.
183. Id. For discussion on the purpose of the entire model court project, see
supra note 151-53 and accompanying text.
184. The Marisol Panel specifically highlighted the difference between the
cultural climate of the New York County Model Court and the FCTP and the cultural
climate of the rest of the New York City Family Court. While the Panel acknowledged
that the reduced caseloads and additional staffing were responsible for some of the
difference, they credited the altered tone of the proceedings-supportive, concerned, and
inquisitive-as being far more important to the overall success of the model courts.
ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 76, at 48-49.
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found so elusive. The model court structure and process form a
prototype to achieve success through the dynamic interaction of
adherence to the substantive goals in a setting conducive to their
achievement. That dynamic interaction is apparent in some of the initial
accomplishments of the New York County Model Court." 5
New York County piloted a Special Expedited Permanency Part
(Special Part) in 1999 and 2000.186 In a recent article, Judge Sara P.
Schechter recounts both her experience as the presiding judge of the
Special Part and as a participant in a two-day conference on "Achieving
Justice: Parents and the Child Welfare System," to highlight what she
believes have been some of the most effective outcomes of the Special
Part.'87 She begins with a litany of the complaints by parents about their
experiences in Family Court expressed during the conference:
As panelists and members of working groups, parents who had
been respondents in Family Court reported a number of
problems in the course of having their cases reviewed: they did
not understand what was going on during the court
proceedings; their lawyers never talked to them or explained
the nature of the proceedings; they were never given an
opportunity to talk in court or tell their side of the "story";
they were never consulted with respect to the formulation of
the service plans for their families; and they had to spend
inordinate amounts of time waiting for their cases to be called
into court and had to return to court many times after repeated
adjournments. Few parents perceived the court process as
having contributed to the reunification of their families. At
best, the court was seen as a rubber stamp for the child welfare
agencies and, at worst, as an independent obstacle and source
of delay. 8
Schechter then outlines how creating a model court that begins
permanency planning at the beginning of the court process-on the day
the case is filed in court-and focuses on conferencing and monitoring
throughout the life of the case resulted in increased respect and
185. See supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text (discussing the accomplishments
of the FCTP).
186. See 2000 STATUS REPORT, supra note 148, at 165-66, 168-69 (discussing the
results of the Special Expedited Permanency Part both in terms of expediting court
processes and decreasing child placements). The New York Model Court did not
include data in the 1999 Status Report so comparisons between this and other model
courts were impossible at the time this Article was researched.
187. Schechter, supra note 146, at 427.
188. Id.
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communication among all the participants; this approach also
significantly diminished delays and resulted in greater numbers of
children staying out of placement.8 9  Moreover, because intake (case
assignment) for the Special Part was random, the part dealt with the
same range of child protective cases that the rest of the child protective
parts handled.' 9 Judge Schechter also credits what she calls "back-end
tracking" to monitor the service plan following the dispositional
conference or hearing as crucial to keeping the case moving toward its
stated goal.' 9' While not all aspects of the process worked smoothly,
particularly settlement conferences to resolve the fact-finding stage of
the proceeding, Schechter concludes that:
Conferences and post-dispositional reviews help parents
receive justice in Family Court. They increase parents'
understanding of the court process and enhance parents' ability
to state their case. They tie the service planning process to
court proceedings so that the court proceedings become more
relevant and the service planning process more equitable.
Because conferencing and post-dispositional reviews improve
communication and clarify expectations among the participants
in the legal process, they are tools that help keep families
together. 92
Judge Schechter's article moves the New York County Model
Court discussion beyond a heavy emphasis on administrative and
procedural change. 193 Moreover, this model court, like the Family
Court Treatment Parts, does not begin at the end of the life of a case-at
termination of parental rights or adoption-but from the moment a
family enters the court's jurisdiction in a child protective proceeding.
By explicitly identifying the ways in which components of the model
court movement can result in keeping families together, Judge Schechter
implicitly answers the broader question of whether the movement has
the capacity to create sustainable reform.
189. Id. at 430, 433-34.
190. Id. at 430. This is in contrast to the screening that the FCTP does. See
supra note 19.
191. Id. at 437-38.
192. Id. at 439.
193. This is still emphasized in New York City's own posting on the National
Council's Model Court site. 2000 STATUS REPORT, supra note 148.
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IV. MODEL COURTS AND SUSTAINABLE REFORM
From an historical perspective, if we consider model courts as
predominantly focused on achieving procedural reform and greater
efficiency, there is great likelihood that they will fail. Since there will
never be sufficient resources allocated for court reform, the court cannot
possibly succeed by restructuring efforts alone. Similar efforts have
failed too many times during the past century."9 Yet the administrative
and procedural aspects of the model court movement may play a crucial
role in sustainable court reform if they are combined with the
substantive, value-added commitment to family integrity.
The structure of model courts builds on a process of cooperation
and collaboration. The courts themselves are supposed to be designed
and implemented by a wide range of professional participants who create
the courts within the legal and judicial framework of the state. The
collaborative process can break down traditional, professional, or
disciplinary barriers by expanding the information and knowledge of the
various participants. Creating the mechanisms that the court will use to
function will highlight both disagreement and consensus, permitting the
participants to hash through the former and recognize the latter. The
participants may also begin to better understand the particular
responsibilities that they each shoulder if they have to discuss them prior
to assuming the role. The process necessary to reach a working
methodology for implementation is not simple. Every model court has
highlighted the time and effort that this type of process takes and the
resistance to embarking on a reform plan.' 95 If resistance to change
were to discourage courts from launching model court reform plans, no
reform effort would ever succeed. As all of the model courts found,
they were each able to begin their efforts and, as time passed, build on
the initial changes by remaining committed to a collaborative structural
process. A commitment to persevere despite resistance is clearly
necessary. 96
The court processes that were ultimately developed reflected a
commitment to collaborative effort within individual cases as well.
While finding the right balance between due process rights and effective
court processes and outcomes remains a concern in any court, the
balance seems particularly difficult to achieve in model courts with their
multi-party "team" efforts. The multi-party, multi-service provider
194. See supra text accompanying notes 36-43.
195. See discussion supra Part III, especially text at notes 150-55.
196. This is not to say that disagreement should not be tolerated. Without rigorous
discussion, the best plans cannot be developed. The commitment must be making the
court work better for the families it serves rather than just accepting the status quo.
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model can overwhelm attention to substantive and procedural due
process. 197 A model court structure divorced from a clear commitment
to legal mandates can look too much like a court proceeding without due
process. 198  For that reason, commitment to the value-added role of
applying family integrity mandates to complement the new procedural
structure will keep the court focused on its ultimate responsibilities. In
this way, model courts have the potential for playing two additional
roles: a secondary preventive role for families at risk of having their
children enter foster care, and a remedial role in reunifying families
when children have been removed from their care.
By providing meaningful opportunities for parents and other family
members to participate in formal and informal court processes, model
court structures reinforce and reflect both psychological family systems
theory and a commitment to family integrity. This occurs in a number
of ways. While child safety and health is usually the triggering
mechanism for bringing families into court for child protective
proceedings, model courts-constructed to use family conferencing,
mediation, and other alternative dispute resolution processes that
emphasize discussion and information-sharing by family members and
professionals-recognize the centrality of a family-oriented structure for
creating solutions for families. These processes maximize the
opportunities for those most directly affected by the power of the child
197. Certainly one of the ongoing concerns with the FCTP for many attorneys
and judges is the requirement that there be an admission of neglect before a parent can
be accepted into the part. Wolf, supra note 5, at 11-12.
198. As Gordon put it:
[T]o use [theories of providing help or treatment to people coming into the
Family Court] as a starting premise not only may distort the facts, but it also
would alter a court's basic approach from one in which it first must find
whether a particular act has occurred-evaluating that past conduct within
standards of substantive law-to an approach that bypasses the fact and legal
questions from the outset to probe into the individual's personality, past
problems, and future treatment needs.
GORDON, supra note 26, at 2-3. Weinstein has a different assessment:
The focus should be on the psychosocial nature of the problems, with the
legal issues in proper perspective and appropriately handled, but not driving
the entire system and not eating up its resources. It should be a hybrid
system which combines the protections of the legal system and advocacy
with the healing goals of the therapeutic and other helping disciplines. The
change should be from an adversarial process to a process which focuses on
collaborative problem solving, including the valuing of complete
information. An important part of this change would be a shift in the
expectations of the professional and client participants with regard to both
substance and procedure. The changed expectations must include societal
expectations for the system, professional practices and ethical standards, and
personal expectations among the participants.
Weinstein, supra note 69, at 141.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
welfare agency and the court to participate actively in seeking solutions
and minimize the tendency to have only the professionals providing
information or negotiating solutions.'
The results look nothing like the current Family Court paradigm.
First, distance between the participants and the professionals is
diminished. Closer personal contact decreases the tendency to
stereotype cases and families. Rather, the complexity of the individuals
and families involved is more obvious. The opportunity to see a family
as more than the subject of a child protective proceeding can result in
more nuanced decision-making, building on family strengths as well as
addressing the factors that resulted in harm to the child. Over time,
understanding and respect can be developed.2' Second, the model court
becomes the site where families and service providers have a consistent
place to meet and share information. 1 The court personnel, including
the judge, can be appreciated as relevant participants in the life of the
case rather than solely as taskmasters or interlopers, mucking up
decisions or arrangements made during extensive periods of time when
the court had nothing to do with the case. The judge, in turn, can make
determinations based on more information and less speculation. Third,
the process of extensive and consistent monitoring-which utilizes
current information to modify services and assistance-diminishes the
effects of sequentiality. °" The judge is able to measure the
consequences of her decisions within a short period of time and thus
alter them if they prove inadequate or wrong. Structuring outcomes that
can build on small steps, taken in short periods of time, enables the
judge to measure capacity for increased responsibility on the part of
parents and other family or community supports. The biases that
traditionally result in a greater likelihood of removal of children from
parental care will be countered by more information about the family,
more opportunity to modify or undo custodial decisions, and heightened
awareness of the consequences of the decisions.
If the mandates of family integrity are applied by judges in the
context of model court processes that utilize these informational and
monitoring mechanisms, three levels of court intervention will emerge
that can ultimately be used in all child welfare proceedings. The first
and most radical under current practice, is the court's determination that
its authority is unnecessary to protect the child or assist the family.
While the court has always had the authority to dismiss a case, the
199. For an example of the negative impact of excluding parents from
negotiations on both the parents and their lawyers, see Spinak, supra note 67, at 2026.
200. See supra note 181.
201. Schechter, supra note 146, at 434.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 69-78.
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authority is rarely used.2 3  Judges traditionally lack sufficient
information about either the family or the service providers to determine
that the family does not need court intervention to protect the child or to
access supportive services. Using the model court structure and
methodology can lead judges to determine at very early stages that the
court cannot provide additional assistance beyond what the family or
service providers identify during the initial phases of the model court
process. As a result, the court can limit its intervention to encouraging
or assisting families to use those resources before dismissing the case
outright or adjourning it in contemplation of dismissal.2' In some of the
cases, the court may affirmatively use its own withdrawal of
intervention as an incentive for participation in services. In this way,
the court acts as a secondary prevention mechanism to maintain families
when the primary mechanism within the social services system was
unable to do so. For many judges, the most difficult lesson will be
learning that not using the full strength of their authority may be better
for families.
The next level of intervention uses all of the model court
mechanisms described previously, but with the court determining that its
jurisdiction is necessary to protect child safety and health and to ensure
family integrity. Whether the court removes a child from parental care
or supervises the child at home, the model court structure becomes the
central device for ensuring the provision of remedial services, parental
and agency observance of negotiated agreements and/or court orders,
and compliance with the expedited legal timeframes currently required
by federal and state law.205 In many model courts, the assumption is
that the parent has submitted to the jurisdiction of the court after
consultation with counsel and has not demanded an adversarial hearing
before entering into a negotiated settlement.20 6 This assumption, based
on the belief that the court cannot demand compliance with various
services or assistance unless the parent has admitted to needing them, is
ultimately invalid. A parent may agree to the need for certain assistance
without admitting that she caused harm to her child, or there may be
legitimate factual disagreements that prevent a parent from admitting to
maltreatment. The family may nevertheless profit greatly from utilizing
the configuration and assistance of the model court. If the model court
203. "None of the 215 cases we observed was dismissed." 1997 VERA STUDY,
supra note 56, at 21.
204. "Mwenty-four percent of the child protective cases brought in the Model
Court, compared to thirteen percent in the Manhattan Family Court, were either
dismissed, withdrawn, or adjourned." Schechter, supra note 146, at 430 n. 10.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 675; N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
2001-02); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1055 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2001-02).
206. See supra note 201.
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structure is ultimately going to provide a framework for all child
protective proceedings, courts will have to develop adversarial
components that honor parents' due process rights but recognize that
these families also can benefit from the model court modalities.
2°7
Holding adversarial hearings on legal and factual issues should not be
seen as a failure in the model court process as long as the process itself
has been used to narrow and define what is truly unresolvable.m
Settlement remains just one of many procedural tools that can assist in
the resolution of a case; it is not the ultimate goal.
The highest level of intervention recognizes that despite great effort
on the part of all the parties (the service providers, the family and
community supports, and the court), family integrity can no longer be
the goal for the family. The role of the model court then is to use all of
its resources and mechanisms to help the legal family be dismantled in
the least harmful and most respectful way. Working closely with the
family over time has enabled all of the participants to understand why
the family cannot continue to function as a legal unit. This knowledge
can be used to encourage the child to gain stability in an alternative
family setting while also considering how members of the original
family can play a role in the child's life.' Thus, at each level of
intervention, the model court can employ its value-added role.
V. CONCLUSION
The Family Court model court movement is barely five years old,
and these courts are just beginning to realize the complexity of their
endeavor. Reading what the courts engaged in this experiment say
about themselves reveals a mixture of shock and optimism: shock at how
hard change is to accomplish, and optimism after seeing real differences
in outcomes for families and children. It is also apparent that some of
their earliest efforts were procedurally-oriented just to get them started.
207. Schechter wrote:
[At the preliminary conference] [p]arents are encouraged to agree to begin
services, although the court cannot order services without a respondent's
consent until after a fact-finding inquiry . . . has been conducted. The vast
majority of respondent-parents agree to start services at this stage upon
hearing that their compliance will help them get their children home sooner.
Schechter, supra note 146, at 432.
208. Id. at 434-36.
209. In her presentation to the Permanent Judicial Commission, Judge Rosa noted
how mediation has been successfully used to resolve termination of parental rights
proceedings by building on the respectful relationships that had been developed earlier
between the parents and the professionals. See supra note 181. The results included
maintaining relationships between the children and their biological relatives. Id.
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Those steps have resulted in administrative restructuring and procedural
mechanisms for problem-solving that can now be applied to the
substantive mandates of the model court movement, an even harder task
to accomplish. Each model court must now commit to the family
integrity mandate if this reform movement is going to be less about
efficiency and more about the court adding value to a family's life. A
key component to determining whether the model court structure heralds
sustainable reform is to develop a comprehensive evaluative process to
measure the effectiveness of the courts' efforts through outcome
analysis.
Ultimately, the model courts must offer a different culture for the
larger court system to embrace. These reforms cannot be separated
from how society views and treats the families streaming through the
courthouse door. I once listened to an upstate judge describe with pride
the adoption ceremonies that are held in her courtroom. The success of
completing the adoptions at record paces and sending the new family out
of the child welfare system filled this judge with immense joy. I asked
her whether she holds similar ceremonies when children are returned to
their biological parents after stays in foster care. She said she had never
considered holding those ceremonies. A few years later, when I
attended the FCTP's first graduation ceremony, I thought about that
judge and whether this ceremony would also fill her with immense joy.
If it would, then model courts may actually be the prototype for
systemic change.
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